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PRIVATIZED COMMUNITIES AND THE
"SECESSION OF THE SUCCESSFUL":
DEMOCRACY AND FAIRNESS
BEYOND THE GATE
Sheryll D. Cashin*
The fabric of civitas, communal commitment to civic and public
life, has begun to rip.1
[A] house divided against itself cannot stand.'
I am trying to envision what happens when 10 or 20 percent of the
population has enough income to bypass the social institutions it
doesn't like in ways that only the top fraction of I percent used to
be able to do .... The Left has been complaining for years that
the rich have too much power. They ain't seen nothing yet.'
INTRODUCTION
In the twentieth century we became a nation of homeowners.
Thanks to a phalanx of federal policies that facilitated broad avail-
ability of credit for buying a home and stimulated housing produc-
tion targeted to the middle class, by the dawn of the New
Millennium an historic high of sixty-seven percent of the American
population were homeowners.4 Among this vast majority of
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Empowerment Zones, Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment ("HUD"), assigned to Vice President Al Gore (1995-96); Director for
Community Development, National Economic Council, The White House (1993-95).
1. EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1997).
2. Id. at 177 (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
3. Irwin M. Stelzer, The Shape of Things to Come, NAT'L REV., July 8, 1991, at
29-30 (quoting Charles Murray).
4. Press Release, Hous. & Urban Dev. Comm'n, Cuomo Says America's Home-
ownership Rate Hits Record High of 67 Percent, With 70.5 Million Families Owning
Their Homes (Oct. 28, 1999) (crediting Clinton Administration economic policies
with raising American's homeownership rate to a record high of sixty-seven percent)
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal), http://www.hud.gov/library/book-
shelfl8/pressrel/pr99-220.html. For a discussion of federal housing policies that stimu-
lated homeownership lending and production, and the racially discriminatory policies
that limited minority homeownership opportunities, see DOUGLASS S. MASSEY &
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American property owners is a significant and growing subset who
live in common interest developments ("CIDs"). Emanating from
Ebenezer Howard's seminal conception of the garden city,5 CIDs
typically require owners who buy units in the development to pay
monthly or annual fees to a residential association that manages
common areas, provides desired services, and enforces rules or
covenants that apply to all who live in the development. CIDs in-
clude planned unit developments of single-family homes, condo-
miniums, and cooperative apartments.6
As of 1998, about forty-two million Americans were living in
CIDs, representing approximately fifteen percent of the U.S. popu-
lation.7 At least eight million members of this CID population re-
side in gated communities.8 The explosive growth of CIDs is
evidenced by the upward trajectory of the homeowners associa-
tions that govern them. Between 1964 and 1992, the number of
homeowners associations grew from a mere 500 to 150,000. 9 By
1998, that number had reached 205,000.1° The Community As-
sociations Institute ("CAI") once estimated that by the year 2000,
225,000 such private governance organizations would be formed,"
representing about twenty percent of all U.S. homeowners. 12 This
privatized governance "may soon rival the 39,000 elected local gov-
ernments in numbers and power over individuals.' 13
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 54-55 (1993); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
5. See generally EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TOMORROW (M.I.T.
Press 1965) (1902). First published in 1902, Howard's book was "a manual for the
financing, building, and operation of a new kind of planned community" that married
comprehensive physical planning with political and economic organization. EVAN MC-
KENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 2-3 (1994) (discussing Howard's "garden city" theory).
6. MCKENZIE, supra note 5, at 7.
7. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood. A Proposal to Replace Zon-
ing with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 827, 829 (1999) (citing CLIFFORD J. TREESE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
FACTBOOK 3 (1999)).
8. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 180 n.1 (estimating that approximately
8.4 million people live in gated communities, but acknowledging that this figure "may
be biased upwards").
9. MCKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11.
10. Nelson, supra note 7, at 829.
11. MCKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11 & n.41 (citing CAI estimates).
12. Nelson, supra note 7, at 863 (citing ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD
POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 145
(1992)).
13. PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 175 (1995).
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Among the services that homeowners associations typically pro-
vide, in exchange for mandatory fees paid by CID residents, are
trash and snow removal, road maintenance, and recreational facili-
ties.14 These private contractual arrangements for the provision of
formerly "public" services have put the nation on a course toward
civic secession. The wedge begins with the creation of a large class
of property owners the members of which increasingly feel that
they are paying twice-in the form of property taxes and residen-
tial association fees for privately administered services. This atti-
tude threatens to predominate in the twenty-first century because
in areas of rapid growth, most new residential developments now
take the form of a CID.
15
The schism widens when one considers the quality of response to
community membership cultivated by CIDs. Residents of CIDs
tend to view themselves as taxpayers rather than citizens, and they
often perceive local property taxes as a fee for services they should
receive rather than their contribution to services local government
must provide to the community as a whole. 6 Several states, in-
cluding Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas, already allow
for adjustments in local taxes for residents of CIDs to reflect ser-
vices provided by their residential associations. 7 At first blush,
this may seem fair. According to the theory supporting such tax
adjustments, CIDs are providing services that are public in nature,
for example, by maintaining roads and park-like spaces that are
open to the public. Hence, proponents of such adjustments argue
that the tax code should be used to allow deductions or abatements
to private citizens who pay assessments for such public goods or
benefits. 8
This conception of the CID's contribution toward public goods
belies reality. Although most CIDs are not physically gated, by
design they are privatized spaces. Frequently, the streets and rec-
reational amenities in CIDs are restricted to residents and their
guests. 19  CIDs offer their residents a private utopia-a
14. Infra note 22 and accompanying text.
15. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11-12.
16. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 139-40; Andrew Stark, America, The
Gated?, WILSON Q., Jan. 1998, at 58, 67 (noting that advocates for tax rebates to
common interest community residents "believe that 'the purpose of government is to
give you back everything in services that you give it in payments, not to take your
money and use it for the benefit of others"') (quoting Doug Kleine, former head of
the research arm of CAI).
17. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 24.
18. Stark, supra note 16, at 69.
19. KANTOR, supra note 13, at 175.
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"privatopia" as one scholar labeled it 20-in which they "can set
their own taxes in the form of assessments, use them for services
they choose, and restrict those benefits to themselves and their im-
mediate neighbors. '2 1 Outsiders who cannot afford properties in a
CID cannot participate in its homeowners association. Outsiders,
moreover, are not likely to benefit directly from the services most
commonly provided by CIDs, such as landscaping, snow removal,
garbage collection, swimming pools, street lights, and street
cleaning.22
But the potential schism between CID residents and those who
do not live in CIDs goes much farther. The secessionist mindset
cultivated by CIDs has crossed an intellectual firewall. In a few
jurisdictions, the previously accepted understanding that public tax
support should not be available for facilities that are wholly private
or exclusive has given way. In 1996, for example, the private gated
community of Panther Valley near Hackettstown, New Jersey was
allowed to set up a special taxing district for the maintenance of
roads that are wholly closed to the general public. As a result, the
residents of Panther Valley are able to deduct what they spend for
private road maintenance from their federal and state income tax
returns.23 Several nearly identical arrangements reportedly have
been created in Florida. 4
This and other forms of "civic secession" have been occurring
across the country. At the extreme, a CID formally secedes from
the surrounding city or county, forming its own incorporated mu-
nicipal government. With such formal secession, the common in-
terest community gains the regulatory powers, particularly zoning
powers, that enable it to attract desired entrants and wall out popu-
lations deemed undesirable. This practice of exclusion is the famil-
iar, unfortunate way of the American suburb.25 In this essay, I will
reflect on how CIDs, and their privatized spaces, are contributing
to a broader phenomenon of civic secession, primarily by affluent
property owners. In particular, I will analyze the way in which
CIDs may affect electoral politics and the allocation of public re-
20. MCKENZIE, supra note 5.
21. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 24-25.
22. Id. at 25 tbl.1-1 (listing services provided by homeowner associations in declin-
ing order of frequency). Less common services, in declining order, included club-
houses, tennis courts, playgrounds, parks, basketball courts, and libraries. Id.
23. Stark, supra note 16, at 78-79.
24. Id. at 79.
25. See generally JACKSON, supra note 4; MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS
OF EXCLUSION (1976).
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sources by federal and state government. The chief threat of CIDs
is that they exacerbate inequality in America while also exacerbat-
ing the challenges of governing. By giving the private property
owner a formal context in which to feel justified in her view that
she is "doing her part" simply by paying her way for services, it will
be increasingly difficult in the twenty-first century to establish a
mandate for governmental policy, whether federal, state, or local,
that requires shared sacrifice. Because most CIDs are extremely
homogenous in terms of race and class, it will be particularly diffi-
cult to build a consensus for public policies that are perceived as
benefiting racial and economic groups that are underrepresented in
the CID, property-holding class.26
I. SECESSION OF THE SUCCESSFUL-HOW CIDs ATTENUATE
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Robert B. Reich, former Secretary of Labor, first coined the
phrase "secession of the successful" and drew attention to the risks
to the social fabric wrought by the so-called new economy and
suburbanization.2 7 CIDs are part of this larger phenomenon. In
this Part, I offer several theories as to how CIDs attenuate the so-
cial contract: (1) they cultivate property owners rather than citi-
zens; (2) they harness economic and racial homogeneity; and (3)
they predominate in new, outer-ring suburban developments,
thereby contributing to an existing phenomenon of regional
polarization.
A. Property Owner Consciousness
A governance mechanism constructed primarily to protect and
preserve private property rights does not build a sense of commu-
nity. Instead, it cultivates an attitude that is a driving force animat-
ing property rights. As some have argued, private property
26. In this essay, I suggest only the potential costs to society of the proliferation of
CIDs. I have not attempted to analyze the benefits to CID residents of participating in
a homeowners association; no doubt, CID residents experience benefits in terms of
service delivery and protection of property values. Nor have I attempted to analyze
the benefits to society of CIDs. Implicit in my critique, however, is a suggestion that
any such benefits are likely outweighed by the social costs I have identified. I wish to
make clear that I have not yet done the empirical research and analytical work to
justify such an assumption. My goal in this brief essay is solely to set out an intui-
tion-a strongly felt one-as to the likely long-term costs of the residential privatiza-
tion movement.
27. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 16.
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ownership enables the individual owner, acting autonomously, to
internalize most of the costs and benefits associated with the prop-
erty owned. z8 In other words, the quality of relationship between
the individual and the state that is cultivated by CIDs is one of a
private property owner rather than a citizen. The essence of pri-
vate property ownership is that the property owner will be secure
in the expectation that the state will support her right to exclude
others from her property as well as derive exclusive benefits in the
use of that property.2 9 Private property rights are necessarily pre-
mised upon rational maximization of self-interest.
Citizenship, on the other hand, is premised on the idea of owing
allegiance to a state or government in which sovereign power is
retained by the people and political rights are shared by all mem-
bers of the polity. A citizen thus owes allegiance to a larger com-
munity and, in turn, expects to be protected by her sovereign
government. It is questionable whether CIDs even do a good job
of promoting a sense of community among their residents. As Ed-
ward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder note:
Studies of homeowner associations have found little evidence
that they breed higher levels of participation and self-govern-
ance. Robert Dilger attributes this effect to flaws in the struc-
ture of [homeowner associations] and to the free-rider
problem-because participation is voluntary, a few individuals
do most of the work, and as long as there are no glaring
problems, the majority feel safe leaving those few to bear the
burden of running the association.3'
Others attribute the lack of participation in homeowner associa-
tions to the fact that the association is premised upon individual
member goals of protecting private property. The payment of fees,
which are in turn applied collectively to services that protect and
enhance property values, is the sole rationale for the homeowner
association. In this sense, there is nothing in the homeowner asso-
ciation structure that engenders a participatory consciousness.3'
28. E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967).
29. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 67-69 (Harcourt, Brace &
Co. 1931) (1840).
30. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 35 (citing ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGH-
BORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNANCE 111 (1992)).
31. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 34-35. Beyond participation in the
homeowner association, Blakely and Snyder suggest, in their study of gated communi-
ties, that the quality of community engendered in CIDs is somewhat impoverished. In
the extreme form of the gated community, private gates create privacy rather than
1680
PRIVATIZED COMMUNITIES
The CID structure thus doubly undermines the notion of citizen-
ship and participation in a larger polity. First, participation in the
CID is premised upon property ownership rather than the concept
of one person, one vote, which demarcates a reduced, privatized
sphere of fealty for the CID resident. Second, the civic or public
realm within the CID is impoverished because the sole rationale
for the homeowners association is protecting private property, and
direct engagement with the CID community is not required to do
this.
B. Homogeneity
Although homogeneity is not intrinsic to the CID concept, in
practice CIDs tend to be highly homogeneous by income and
race.32 Economic and racial selection is fueled by the practices of
real estate developers and other actors in the real estate industry.
Developers tend to tailor new planned developments to particular
income brackets, and the real estate industry is notorious for racial
steering that contributes to a high degree of racial segregation, par-
ticularly of African Americans.33 Because CIDs are becoming the
norm in high-growth, developing areas, the widespread use of ex-
clusionary zoning in such areas also contributes to the homogeneity
of CIDs.
The homogeneity of CIDs, like the homogeneity of most devel-
oping suburbs, contributes to the phenomenon of civic secession.
As Blakely and Snyder suggest, it is difficult to maintain the social
contract in a context of increasingly formalized separation of dif-
fering classes and races.34 Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence
that the desire for homogeneity, particularly by whites, has been
community. Blakely and Snyder note that residents tend to keep to themselves and do
not interact with each other. See generally id. Similarly, one empirical study of gated
communities suggests that relying on the gate and hired security guards creates a false
sense of security. Because residents believe that the gated community provides ade-
quate security, they feel no ownership in the protection of community assets. This
bulwarking approach to defensible space lacks the element of social responsibility
needed to create natural surveillance and community bonding, which is essential for
territorial functioning to succeed. Georjeanna Wilson-Doenges, An Exploration of
Sense of Community and Fear of Crime in Gated Communities, 32 ENV'T & BEHAV.
597, 608 (2000).
32. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 148-49.
33. Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 743-44
(2001) (discussing racial steering and selective marketing practices by the real estate
industry).
34. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 154-55.
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the chief impetus for the creation of new suburban localities."
One resident of a suburb poignantly accepted this attitude:
See, you have to understand the fundamental feeling in suburbia
is fear, let's face it. The basic emotional feeling is fear. Fear of
blacks, fear of physical harm, fear of their kids being subjected
to drugs, which are identified as a black problem, fear of all the
urban ills. They feel [that] by moving to the suburbs they've run
away from it, in fact, they haven't, in reality they haven't, but in
their own mind's eye they've moved away from the problem.36
CIDs, particularly those that are gated, also are premised in part
on assuaging a fear of "other." For example, one marketing bro-
chure for a gated community north of Dallas called upon prospec-
tive residents to imagine a "'perfect place to live ... outside the
pandemonium of the city,' where there can be 'a return to simpler
times, when you knew you were secure within the boundaries of
your own neighborhood ... [and] where children could play unat-
tended and be safe after dark."' 37 Indeed, gated communities and
CIDs generally are most common in those parts of the country
where foreign immigration has been highest.3 8 Blakely and Snyder
conclude that "gated areas ... represent[ ] a concrete metaphor for
the closing of the gates against immigrants and minorities and the
poverty, crime and social instabilities in society at large. ''39
As a result of this homogeneity, the possibility for cooperation
between CID and non-CID communities is lessened." Homogene-
ity also decreases the potential for empathy with racial and eco-
nomic groups that are not represented in the CID because of a lack
35. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1993-94
(2000) (noting that the desire for racial exclusion was a dominant factor in the forma-
tion of new suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s).
36. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 155-56 (quoting a participant from a
study on community and place).
37. David Dillon, Fortress America: More and More of Us are Living Behind
Locked Gates, PLAN., June 1994, at 8.
38. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 152 (noting this proliferation in both
California and Florida). Blakely and Snyder also report that the seven states that
experienced an unprecedented wave of foreign immigration in the 1980s simultane-
ously encountered significant white out-migration. Id. (discussing this migration pat-
tern in California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Texas).
Many of the states to which whites are fleeing also have experienced a rapid increased
in gated communities. Id.
39. Id.
40. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2019-20 (citing empirical research on the formation
of inter-local agreements, and noting that predominately white localities only enter
into such agreements with localities that have a similar racial composition).
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of direct daily experience with such groups. Finally, where homo-
geneity is achieved, protecting it often becomes a primary ratio-
nale, which in turn may encourage CID residents to support
exclusionary policies that limit certain opportunities for non-CID
residents.4'
C. Privatization Mainly for New Suburban Developments
As of 1990, fifty-one percent of CIDs were planned-unit devel-
opments of single-family homes, while forty-two percent were con-
dominiums and seven percent were cooperatives. 42 In the twenty-
first century, CIDs are likely to predominate in high-growth, outer-
ring areas, where most new residential subdivisions are being de-
veloped. CIDs are likely to be more limited in the urbanized core
because the transaction costs of organizing an existing neighbor-
hood into a CID are considerable. It is much easier to impose a
regime of mutually enforceable restrictive covenants, including
mandatory membership and payment of fees to a homeowner asso-
ciation, when a new residential community is being formed for the
first time.43 CID formation in the urban core has been limited
mainly to public street closings, which are more likely to arouse
opposition by prior users of public streets.4
If CIDs predominate in outer-ring suburbs, this will only acceler-
ate a process of regional polarization that has been occurring in
many metropolitan areas across the nation. In the typical Ameri-
can metropolis, an affluent, outer-ring quadrant garners the major-
ity of the region's public infrastructure investments and the vast
majority of the region's economic growth, while using local powers
to effectively wall itself off from most of the region's social service
burdens.45 Citizens in the outer-ring thus enjoy the best retail and
commercial amenities, the best schools, and the strongest tax base,
with concomitant low tax rates. Meanwhile, citizens of the urban
41. Id. at 2019-22 (citing evidence on the impact of homogeneity in exacerbating
political competition and social tension in metropolitan regions).
42. McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 11.
43. Cf. Sanborn v. McClean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (upholding a reciprocal
negative easement barring commercial uses in a single family subdivision, and ex-
plaining that such restrictions "fastened" to the entire subdivision at the time it was
held by a common owner, the original developer).
44. According to the CAI, developers of CIDs typically are interested in undevel-
oped areas; they rarely develop property in preexisting neighborhoods because of the
costs associated with such development. When a CID does form in a preexisting
neighborhood, it usually is the result of current residents organizing themselves. Inter-
view with staff of Community Associations Institute (Mar. 19, 2001).
45. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2002-15.
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core often are saddled with a concentration of poverty, rising ser-
vice demands, higher taxes, and a shrinking or stagnant tax base.4 6
A concentration and cultivation of a CID, property-owning class in
the outer-ring threatens to exacerbate this rift by entrenching a be-
lief among affluent property owners that they need not contribute
to a regional tax base, much less participate in solving problems
that transcend local borders or individual neighborhoods.
Although a CID resident might feel justified in maintaining such
a secessionist viewpoint, outer-ring CID developments often bene-
fit from state expenditures on their behalf. Often, "[t]heir streets,
fire hydrants, street lamps, and other facilities were paved, in-
stalled, or constructed at public expense. ' '4 7 The extent to which
CIDs are subsidized by the non-CID polity should be studied and
documented.48 Many states and counties have been getting
smarter, imposing exactions that force developers (or their buyers)
to assume a greater percentage of the cost for the often-duplicative
new infrastructures necessary to create new planned unit develop-
ments.4 9 However, empirical evidence suggests that a great deal of
cross-subsidization is occurring in metropolitan regions: citizens of
the urbanized core are subsidizing development in affluent, high-
growth communities where CIDs are concentrated. 50 This reality
highlights the fairness and equity concerns surrounding the priva-
tization of residential communities. Scholars and observers of this
movement will be called upon increasingly to grapple with the
question of whether an affluent class of property owners should be
able to use privatization techniques to protect their tax base while
continuing to garner certain benefits, including subsidies and work-
ers, from the non-CID polity.
II. CIVIC SECESSION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
CIDs create a risk that, as more and more citizens separate
themselves into homogenous private communities, their ties to the
46. Id. at 2022-27.
47. David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Im-
pact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 774 (1995).
48. In researching this essay, I was unable to find such data. According to the
CAI, there is no system for registering CIDs-registration or membership with CAI is
completely voluntary-which makes it difficult to collect data or assess the external
costs to surrounding municipalities of CID development. Interview with staff of Com-
munity Associations Institute (Mar. 19, 2001).
49. See generally Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund
State and Local Government Infrastructure Improvements and Affordable Housing?,
23 REAL EST. L.J. 7 (1994).
50. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2004-09.
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larger polity will become attenuated and they will increasingly re-
sist governmental efforts to address problems that they do not per-
ceive as "theirs." As much as twenty percent of the U.S.
population now live in CIDs, and this growing segment is becoming
an increasingly organized and vocal constituency, particularly
around the issue of tax adjustment. 51 Residents of CIDs have the
advantage of being organized via their homeowners associations.
More importantly, the CID's mandatory fee-for-service arrange-
ment encourages CID residents in the belief that they should have
a limited fiscal obligation beyond their immediate community.
In California, Florida and other states with permissive govern-
ment formation laws, developers are working with [CID] re-
sidents to create cities that are separate from the existing
jurisdiction-city or county. People find these new cities, cre-
ated by secession, attractive for many reasons. Using housing
and growth regulations, the new jurisdictions can pass regula-
tory ordinances that restrict new entrants. And they can direct
publicly collected taxes to locally specified goals rather than al-
lowing them to be used over a larger area.52
Thus, CIDs can facilitate both an informal form of secession in
which CID residents procure a tax adjustment for their homeowner
association fees and a more extreme, formal secession in which
CID residents form their own local government and cut ties to sur-
rounding jurisdictions. Beyond such formal or informal secession,
the proliferation of CIDs, like the proliferation of new suburban
governments that has accompanied five decades of suburbaniza-
tion,53 is likely to have an impact on the political economy. In this
Part, I offer evidence of secessionist attitudes among suburban vot-
ers and conjecture as to the likely impact of CIDs on the political
economy as they become an increasingly dominant form of home
ownership in the new century. I then suggest how the proliferation
of the CID, property-owning class may accelerate structural inequi-
ties in the American metropolis.
51. Kennedy, supra note 47, at 774-77; Stark, supra note 16, at 66-69 (describing
the movement to make homeowners association fees tax deductible).
52. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 25; see also KANTOR, supra note 13, at
164 (explaining the economic rationale for defensive incorporation of a new munici-
pality, including the ability to cut ties to the central city with its higher taxes and
redistributive expenditures).
53. Cashin, supra note 35, at 1992 (noting that the number of municipalities and
special districts doubled from 24,500 to 50,834 between 1942 and 1992).
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A. Evidence of Secessionist Voter Attitudes: Electoral Politics
Empirical research by political scientists and public finance
scholars suggests that decentralization of the polity limits its capac-
ity for shared sacrifice or redistributive spending. For example, at
the state level, the outcome of most fiscal debates is determined by
suburban, middle-class voters. 54 Elsewhere, I have marshaled ex-
tensive evidence demonstrating that, at the state level, voters exact
a high penalty against state elected officials for redistributive
spending." In particular, voters in state elections display singular
antipathy toward welfare spending. They dislike this type of
spending three times more than they dislike any other type of
spending.56 At the same time, voters do not penalize presidents in
national elections for welfare spending. 7
This phenomenon suggests a limit to my theory. Although the
fragmentation of the polity into homogenous communities of class
and race may be contributing to a schism between middle-class and
affluent suburbs, on the one hand, and declining localities in the
urban core, on the other hand, this interlocal competition for pub-
lic and private resources is most pronounced at the state and local
level. At the national level, where citizen influence over fiscal pol-
icy debates is necessarily attenuated and one national tax base
bears the burden of any redistributive spending, formal secession is
impossible and voters apparently feel more comfortable with the
idea of shared sacrifice.5 8 At the state and local level, however,
voters seemingly experience the wrench of government policy
choices more potently. They are more likely to view state fiscal
policy debates as about spending "their" money, and they are more
likely to directly correlate the actions of government with the ser-
vices they receive. At the same time, middle-class suburban inter-
ests compete vigorously for the allocation of public resources in
fiscal policy debates, and they appear to be winning.
54. Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform and the Minority Poor: Ac-
counting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 583-91 (1999)
(citing, inter alia, empirical research demonstrating that median-income voters exert
decisive influence on the fiscal policy choices of governors).
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 585 (noting that voters do not display antipathy toward particular types
of federal spending).
58. That does not mean, however, that voters are enthusiastic about redistributive
spending at the national level. Cf. id. at 597-98 (noting the limited possibility for
changing appreciably current distributions of income and wealth); see also text accom-
panying notes 67-75 (discussing presidential politics in the 1990s and beyond).
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The evidence on education finance supports this trend. For three
decades, advocates for equal funding in public education have pur-
sued litigation that is typically premised upon state constitution ed-
ucation clauses. To date, about twenty state supreme courts have
declared their state's system of school finance unconstitutional and
have ordered remedies.5 9 A number of state legislatures also have
taken on school finance reform, even in the absence of a court
mandate. One study comparing the outcomes of court-ordered
and voluntary legislative reforms concluded that only when a state
court ordered a specific remedy did state legislatures effectively
close the gap in funding between poor and affluent school dis-
tricts.6" In the absence of a court order, school finance reforms did
not equalize funding between such districts and sometimes they ac-
tually left poor school districts worse off.6 Instead, middle-class
suburban school districts typically benefited most under any volun-
tary school finance reform.62
This evidence highlights the structural consequences of political
fragmentation for public policy choices made at the state level.
Formal segmentation of the polity sets up a horizontal competition
for public and private investment, for high-end uses of land, and
for high-end taxpayers. Those who adhere to Tieboutian63 logic
view this horizontal competition as healthy for mobile citizen-vot-
ers who have a choice about where to live and work. The dark side
to this fragmentation, however, is that citizens in their individual
localities rationally are motivated to maximize benefits for their
own community and limit fiscal burdens by denying access to popu-
lations and land uses that they perceive as undesirable. 64 New lo-
calities in outer-ring developing suburbs, for example, historically
have resisted taking on any form of affordable housing. Those few
areas in the country that have meaningful regional fair-share af-
59. For an excellent overview of the equity funding litigation movement, see
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
60. Cashin, supra note 54, at 587 & n.146 (citing William N. Evans et al., School-
houses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
10, 28 (1997)).
61. Cashin, supra note 54, at 587-88 & n.149 (citing Neil D. Theobald & Faith
Hanna, Ample Provision for Whom?: The Evolution of State Control over School Fi-
nance in Washington, 17 J. EDuc. FIN. 7, 22-25 (1991)).
62. Cashin, supra note 54, at 588 (citing Paul N. Courant & Susanna Loeb, Cen-
tralization of School Finance in Michigan, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 114
(1997)).
63. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956) (arguing that a citizen, as a "consumer-voter," chooses to locate in that
community which best satisfies his or her pattern of preferences for public goods).
64. KANTOR, supra note 13, at 164.
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fordable housing requirements have achieved them as a result of a
supra-local mandate-a state court order, for example-that was
necessary to overcome virulent local resistance.65
I believe that CIDs are likely to magnify this trend. Even though
most CIDs are not formal municipal islands unto themselves, they
provide a formal context that distances their residents both fiscally
and physically from those who live outside the CID. Unlike busi-
ness improvement districts ("BIDs"), in which businesses within
the district tax themselves in order to make their district more at-
tractive and viable to a public that is invited to enter the BID,66
CIDs are exclusionary and exclusive entities.
One can only guess at the impact such privatized governance
would have on the polity were we to reach a point where the ma-
jority of American homeowners lived in CIDs. If recent trends in
presidential politics are any guide, I believe this formal contextual-
ization and encouragement of fiscal self-maximization (some would
say selfishness) will accelerate the suburban politics of the 1990s.
In the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections, both major polit-
ical parties could not avoid the reality that two-thirds of American
voters now lived in suburbs.67 With each of these elections, the
nation witnessed increasing political competition for the hearts and
minds of suburban voters.
One manifestation of this competition was the pursuit of puni-
tive policies toward the most disenfranchised. In 1992, then-candi-
date Bill Clinton established his bona fides with suburban voters,
inter alia, by supporting the death penalty68 and promising to "end
welfare as we know it. '' 69 In anticipation of his 1996 bid for reelec-
tion, President Clinton signed a welfare reform law70 that many of
65. Cashin, supra note 35, at 2031-33.
66. See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Im-
provement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999) (discussing
characteristics of BIDs and their contributions to urban life).
67. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5 (1993) (noting that by 1990, more
than sixty percent of metropolitan area inhabitants lived in suburbs and a majority of
the jobs in those metropolitan areas were located in suburbs).
68. JUSTICE POLICY INST., Too LITTLE Too LATE: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PRISON
LEGACY (2001) ("During his 1992 campaign, to illustrate his resolve, President Clin-
ton actually interrupted his campaigning to return to his home state of Arkansas to
oversee the execution of mentally retarded death row inmate Ricky Ray Rector."),
http://www.cjcj.org/clinton/clinton.html.
69. E.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 49.
70. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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his own policy advisors believed was unnecessarily punitive toward
the poor.7 ' In addition, during his eight years in office, President
Clinton oversaw the addition of fifty new death penalties to the
federal penal code and the largest expansion of the prison popula-
tion in American history." Although Clinton was touted by Toni
Morrison as "the first black President, ' 73 a disproportionate num-
ber of these new prisoners were African Americans.74 Without
question, the poor and racial minorities benefited from numerous
Clinton Administration policies. My point is that Clinton felt
compelled to pursue other, more punitive policies that clearly sig-
naled to suburban voters-read whites-that he was a Democrat
who could be trusted to govern. President George W. Bush's pur-
suit of tax policies that greatly favor affluent voters76 is less obvi-
ously tied to the suburbanization of the electorate. However,
ironic evidence of how far the center of gravity in American polit-
ics has shifted with decades of suburbanization can be seen when
one considers that it was a Republican President, Richard Nixon,
who first proposed a national income floor for welfare recipients.77
B. Structured Inequality
CIDs, like homogeneous new suburban localities, may contrib-
ute to structural inequalities in American society. The American
71. Edelman, supra note 69.
72. David Cole, Editorial, Faith Succeeds Where Prison Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2001, at A21 (noting that Clinton's "legacy with respect to the crime problem included
the enactment of more than 50 new federal death penalties and the largest increase in
the prison population in American history"); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra
note 68 (noting that during President Clinton's first term 148,000 more state and fed-
eral prisoners were added to the nation's prison system than during President Rea-
gan's first term, and 34,000 more were incarcerated than during President Bush's
four-year term).
73. Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 32.
74. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 68 (noting that although the African Ameri-
can incarceration rate increased in the twelve years prior to Clinton's term, the rate
actually doubled during the Clinton era).
75. E.g., Editorial, An Appraisal: Bill Clinton's Mixed Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2001, § 4, at 16 (noting a "progressive record" of accomplishments, including an ex-
panded Earned Income Tax Credit, a health care program for poor children, the
doubling of Head Start and school aid for the disadvantaged, and an increase in col-
lege tuition assistance for low- and moderate-income students, such that "an ex-
traordinary $64 billion is now newly channeled annually to working-class and poor
families").
76. E.g., Bill Pascrell Jr., Editorial, Bush's 'Goldilocks' Tax Plan is Irresponsible,
THE RECORD (N.J.), Apr. 9, 2001, at L3 (stating that President Bush's proposed tax
plan will provide almost fifty percent of its relief to those earning more than $1.1
million annually).
77. Cashin, supra note 54, at 570 n.74.
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metropolis currently is characterized by differential opportunities
for many of its citizens based upon where they live. The differ-
ences in the education and economic access available to children of
outer-ring suburbs compared to that available to children of inner-
city ghettoes are all too obvious.78 Anyone who lives in America
knows about these differences. Less well known or obvious are the
differences in opportunity between, for example, middle-class
black communities and middle-class white ones. Elsewhere, I have
documented the negative impact of racial isolation on affluent or
middle-class blacks who live in predominately black settings, dem-
onstrating that the opportunity structure is more precarious in mid-
dle-class black suburbs than in predominately white suburban
communities.79 CIDs, like homogenous local suburbs, may con-
tribute to fiscal inequalities among communities in the American
metropolis. Should CIDs predominate in affluent communities, as
I predict above,8° and should the emerging practice of conferring
tax adjustments on CID residents become de rigueur, the CID,
property-owning class will privatize its tax base to a degree. One
possible consequence of such a development would be the reduc-
tion of revenues available to states and localities to provide needed
government services outside CID areas. Another consequence of
CID proliferation also may be to heighten differences in services,
amenities, and, ultimately, private investment, between CID and
non-CID communities.
To the extent that CIDs cultivate reduced empathy for persons
or problems beyond the CID border, the most potent long-term
impact of CIDs (and socioeconomic residential segregation) will be
a reduced tax base for addressing the problems of the poor. Even
at the federal level, where all U.S. taxpayers must participate, there
is a risk of increasing resistance on the part of the CID class, and
78. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 60-82 (discussing the extreme isolation of
hyper-segregated, inner-city communities where approximately one-third of African
Americans live); James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing
Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income
Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1993) (documenting the substantial differences in edu-
cation and employment opportunities available to low-income persons who were
placed in assisted housing in Chicago and its surrounding suburbs).
79. Middle-class black suburbs tend to be characterized by lower performing
schools and higher crime rates than their predominately white counterparts; they tend
to be 180 degrees in the opposite direction from the areas of highest economic
growth; and they tend to attract low-income minorities, with attendant social service
demands and social distress. See generally Cashin, supra note 33.
80. Supra Part I.C.
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others geographically removed from the poor, to expending federal
funds for redistributive aims.
Bringing CIDs or gates to poor or minority communities will not
equalize the situation and, in some cases, it may even make matters
worse. As noted, even affluent blacks are harmed by racial isola-
tion.8 1 Organizing a racially isolated community through the crea-
tion of a CID is not likely to overcome the systematic
disinvestment by whites and commercial actors that tends to ac-
company racial isolation, particularly of African Americans. 2 In
addition, empirical research on the impact of gating existing low-
income communities suggests that such strategies had little
impact.83
CONCLUSION
CIDs are an inevitable fact of life in the United States. They are
likely to become a dominant form of private home ownership in
the next century. They present a very real threat to the social con-
tract in America because they inculcate secessionist attitudes,
which will be very hard to counter. As CIDs continue to prolifer-
ate, America will need effective public forums in which to mediate
and negotiate solutions to problems that transcend borders, gates,
and neighborhoods. Federal and state public officials are best posi-
tioned to pursue policies that mitigate the externalities wrought by
increasingly atomized and privatized communities. But building a
consensus or a mandate for public action that requires shared sacri-
fice will be increasingly difficult as the polity continues to separate.
The best hope for change is the potential for the vast array of
citizens who do not live in CIDs to build coalitions based upon
enlightened self-interest. Reversing regional inequity will take
churches, unions, renters, minority groups, environmentalists, city
dwellers, commuters disgusted with traffic, and a host of other po-
tential common allies bound together in an effort to pursue en-
lightened public policies that can benefit the entire metropolitan
region. Policies like regional land use planning, regional tax-base
sharing, regional affordable housing development, and regional
81. Supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
82. Cashin, supra note 33, at 763-65.
83. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 1, at 153-54 (concluding that although
"[g]ated communities do not in themselves cause discrimination and residential segre-
gation ... they are part of a pattern, with all its attendant effects on economic and
social opportunity").
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governance could put our nation on a course toward more fairness,
opportunity, and, dare I imagine it, civic engagement.84
84. E.g., Cashin, supra note 33, at 771-75 (arguing for these regional strategies);
Peter W. Salsich Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing and Neighbor-
hood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 578-79 (1999).
